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I. INTRODUCTION
In Carpenter v. United States,2 the Supreme Court held that law
enforcement officials may no longer retrieve the cell-site location
information from cell network carriers without first obtaining a warrant.3
The Court ruled that collection of this information was protected by the

1
J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A. 2017, George
Washington University. Thank you to all of those who encouraged me to keep thinking,
learning, and advocating for what I believe in. My family, my teachers and professors, my
friends and fellow law students, and the faculty at the law school have all been instrumental
in my growth as an aspiring attorney. I hope to one day impart the same wisdom onto those
after me.
2
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
3
Id. at 2221.
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Fourth Amendment due to the sensitive nature of location tracking.4 Prior
to Carpenter, prosecutors could acquire location information from carriers
without a warrant because courts found that suspects had voluntarily given
the information to their cellular network carrier, thereby depriving the
location information of its subjective privacy interest.5 In the realm of
genetic information and its use in criminal investigations, law enforcement
officials can use DNA in a variety of ways and may acquire it covertly,
consensually, by force, or from family members.6 Because there is no
privacy interest in abandoned property or voluntarily revealed information,
law enforcement officials have circumvented privacy interests in genetic
data by claiming that a person who exposes their DNA to a company or
website that collects and analyzes DNA (such as Ancestry.com or 23&Me)
has somehow undermined their privacy interest in their own genetic
information.7
While Carpenter concerned the government’s acquisition of cell-site
location services, its rationale regarding the government’s general
acquisition practices can also apply to the acquisition and use of DNA
information. This rationale could call for future regulatory legislation to
require a warrant to acquire and use a suspect’s genetic information. This
comment will show that genetic information deserves special protection due
to its sensitive and immutable nature, and that new regulations should be
promulgated to effectively protect the citizenry from a “too permeating
police surveillance.”8 Part II will analyze all of the ways in which police
currently use genetic information and under what circumstances genetic
information is protected. Part III will examine the implications of exposing
an individual’s genetic information, and the interest in keeping that
information private and protected. Part IV will look to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Carpenter to determine how to effectively regulate law
enforcement’s acquisition and use of DNA in solving crimes.

4

See id. at 2221–22.
See id. at 2216.
6
See Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413 (2001).
7
See Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (April 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killergenealogy.html.
8
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2231.
5
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II. HOW LAW ENFORCEMENT UTILIZES DNA
A. What Justifies Police Collection of an Arrestee’s Genetic
Information?
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Maryland v. King,9 and granted
law enforcement across the nation the ability to save the DNA of arrestees—
arrested wrongly or otherwise—to the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS), where it can be used to identify suspects in past crimes, future
crimes, or cold cases.10 In DNA testing, the coding regions are known as
genes and contain the information necessary for a cell to make proteins, but
non-protein-coding regions are not related directly to making proteins and
have been referred to as “junk DNA.”11 The Supreme Court stated that “junk
DNA” contains no “far reaching and complex characteristics like genetic
traits.”12
In Maryland v. King, Alonzo King was arrested for first and second
degree assault and was compelled by police officers to participate in a
“buccal swab” of the inside of his cheeks.13 At the time, under the Maryland
DNA Collection Act, a DNA sample must have directly related to “the
identification of individuals” involved in the crime, and an officer was not
permitted to “perform a search of the statewide DNA database for the
purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which
the offender may be a biological relative.”14 In the context of Fourth
Amendment protection, the Court held that “a buccal swab on the inner
tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”15
But the Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to defend against “intrusions
which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an
improper manner.”16 The “ultimate measure” of the constitutionality of a
governmental search is reasonableness, and the Court found the “buccal

9

569 U.S. 435 (2013).
Id. at 441.
11
Id. at 442.
12
Id. at 442-43.
13
Id. at 440 (“As part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses, his DNA
sample was taken by applying a cotton swab or filter paper . . . to the inside of his cheeks.”).
14
Id. at 444 (emphasis added) (citing Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety § 2-506(d)).
15
King, 569 U.S. at 446 (“The Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to police efforts
to draw blood, scraping an arrestee’s fingernails to obtain trace evidence and even to a
breathalyzer test.”) (internal citations omitted).
16
Id. at 447 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)) (internal
quotations omitted).
10

SOBH(DO NOT DELETE)

632

6/3/2020 3:55 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

swab . . . falls within this category.”17 But even if a warrant is not required,
a search “must be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution,” and the
Court balanced the “privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns
to determine if the intrusion [was] reasonable.”18
The government in King argued that it had an interest in collecting
arrestees’ DNA to (1) identify the arrestee, (2) guarantee the safety of police
officers, (3) ensure the persons accused are available for trials, (4) know an
individual’s past conduct and accurately determine bail, and (5) aid in crime
solving and possibly free persons wrongly imprisoned.19 The Court then
weighed these interests against the privacy-related interests of DNA
collection by examining technology’s evolution and use in solving crimes,
while making reference to other means of identification such as
“photographing and fingerprinting.”20 The Court acknowledged that “DNA
identification is an advanced technique superior to finger-printing in many
ways” but the Court stated “[t]he additional intrusion upon the arrestee’s
privacy is not significant,” so it gave great weight both to the significant
government interest at stake in the identification of arrestees, and to the
unmatched potential of DNA identification to serve that interest.21
The Court in King explained that the arrestee’s privacy-related interest
is “a minimal one.”22 The reasonableness of any search “must be considered
in the context of the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy,” and the
Court noted “the expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police
custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.’”23
The Court
distinguished the diminished privacy interests of arrestees and the search at
issue in the case from “the sort of programmatic searches of . . . the public at
large,” which might have a heightened expectation of privacy.24 But, in the
absence of individualized suspicion, the Court has insisted on the search
having “some purpose other than to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing” to
justify the search as necessary.25 The Court held that individualized
suspicion was not categorically required for King because of his “diminished
expectations of privacy” and because the intrusion was “minimal.”26 The
Court closed its opinion by reiterating that the defendant’s DNA is used only
for identification, that CODIS did not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 448.
Id. (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001)).
Id. at 449-56.
Id. at 459.
King, 569 U.S. at 459-61.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)).
Id.
Id. at 463 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 463.
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(just his “junk DNA”), and the Court reassured readers of its opinion that the
Maryland DNA Collection Act guards against further invasions of privacy.27
King established that arrestees have a more limited scope of privacy
interests than suspects of crimes, but the Court only saw DNA for its
productive use in identification, comparing it to categorically different
information such as photographing or fingerprinting, and thereby failed to
see its potential for exposing private information.
The Court
mischaracterized non-coding regions of DNA as “junk DNA” when there is
in fact sensitive information available in non-coding regions.28 The
remainder of Part II will discuss the potential risks associated with the
exposure of sensitive genetic information, but it is necessary to understand
how the Supreme Court’s characterization of genetic information has set the
foundation for the current lack of protection in DNA collection and analysis.
B. What Justifies Law Enforcement Collection of Genetic Information
from Suspects?
1. Voluntary Exposure of Genetic Information
While arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy, mere
criminal suspects retain the full body of constitutional protections.29 The
Fourth Amendment protects against “police efforts to obtain samples directly
from suspects,” but that prohibition only applies to government action,
leaving open the possibility that “the police may be able to acquire
preexisting information from cooperative private hospitals or laboratories
without a court order and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”30
This would rely on the fact that the individual provided the third party with
the information, stripping it of its privacy interest, and allowing the
government to avoid engaging in any search or seizure.31
This loophole acts as a work-around people’s privacy rights. What is
constitutionally protected by the Fourth Amendment relies both on what a
person’s actual subjective expectation of privacy is, as well as whether that
expectation is one that society is willing to accept as reasonable.32 In the
seminal privacy case, Katz v. United States,33 the government acquired
evidence by attaching a recording device to a phone booth and argued that
there was no search because there was no physical trespass, and because the
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

King, 569 U.S. at 464-65.
See Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881 (2015).
King, 569 U.S. at 462.
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 425.
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 425.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 348–49.
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phone booth was a public place. The Court ruled, and Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion further extrapolated, that because the federal agents had
no warrant authorizing the interception, the search violated the Fourth
Amendment and warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to
some exceptions.34 Justice Harlan explained that “there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”35
Subsequently, the Supreme Court applied the Katz test in United States
v. Miller,36 and found that Miller, charged with possessing an unregistered
still, was evading taxes.37 The bank cooperated with law enforcement by
surrendering information and records on Miller’s account, and Miller moved
to suppress the documents on the ground that he made the information
available to the bank for a “limited purpose.”38 The Court rejected this
argument on the grounds that Miller had taken the risk to reveal his affairs
and that he understood they might be conveyed to the government.39 The
Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and [that] the confidence placed in the
third party [would] not be betrayed.”40
Professor Imwinkelried and Professor Kaye have identified three bases
to distinguish Miller from cases involving DNA: (1) Miller involved bank
records concerning commercial transactions, not DNA, which contains
intimate and private medical information; (2) even if Miller applies to
medical documents, it probably does not apply to a physical DNA sample
because the sample represents a greater threat to privacy on account of the
ability to derive much more—possibly unrelated—private information; and
(3) where Miller voluntarily conveyed the information to the bank, law
enforcement’s “voluntary” acquisition of DNA is debatable depending on
the circumstances.41
2. “Abandoned” DNA
DNA may be covertly taken by police by following “a bread-crumb
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at 357.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
Id. at 436; Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 427.
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 427; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
Id.
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 429-31.
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trail of identifying DNA matter.”42 According to current law and regulation,
an individual who has “abandoned . . . [genetic] material in a public place,
retains no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.”43
Currently,
“[c]onstitutional law offers virtually no protection to suspects who are
targeted for their abandoned DNA,” and “existing Fourth Amendment law is
ill-suited to the facts of abandoned DNA collection.”44 As stated above,
police activity “constitutes a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes only
if the person claiming an illegal search exhibits both an actual expectation of
privacy and one that ‘society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”‘“45
While acquiring a person’s DNA by force would constitute a search, “where
suspects ‘knowingly expose’ items to public view, the Court has held that
the collection of such evidence falls outside the Fourth Amendment’s
protections.”46
Most people would not think that throwing away a water bottle,
hairbrush, or toothbrush means you are giving up your right to privacy in
your DNA, but under the current understanding, that is exactly what it
means. Viewing DNA as “abandoned” is untenable because its emission or
emanation in public places cannot be avoided—and this is true whether it is
hair, saliva, or any other involuntarily secreted material containing genetic
information.47 Legal scholars have found that “the Fourth Amendment query
focuses on the item left behind—usually of no concern to the person
targeted—rather than the genetic information contained within it,” so, as
applied, “the Fourth Amendment fails to protect genetic privacy
adequately.”48 While the Supreme Court has found that garbage may not
maintain a privacy interest since it has been abandoned and left for
collection, DNA is clearly different because “one can shred papers or burn
garbage . . . but leaving DNA in public places cannot be avoided.”49
Therefore, the analogy of DNA to trash may not be the most productive or
accurate. Some have put forth other analogies for DNA, comparing it to
fingerprints, the body and its organs, or human waste; meanwhile, others
have advocated for genetic exceptionalism.50 While the Court in King
42

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 6, at 437.
44
Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 863 (2006).
45
Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
46
Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
47
Id. at 867.
48
Id. at 866.
49
Id. at 867.
50
Joh, supra note 44, at 868–74. Genetic exceptionalism is the belief that genetic
information is special and so must be treated differently from other types of medical data or
other personally identifiable information.
43
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compared the use of DNA for identification to the use of fingerprints, this
comparison is shaky at best. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, “the
Court’s comparison of Maryland’s DNA searches to other techniques such
as fingerprinting, can seem apt only to those who know no more than today’s
opinion chose to tell them about how those DNA searches actually work.”51
As technology evolves, we are deriving increased information from
DNA. As Part II will explain in detail, our previous scientific understanding
of DNA has changed since King, and ‘junk’ DNA is no longer a term used
to describe the DNA analyzed for identification because scientist have found
private information in these parts of DNA.52 Surely, the code that contains
all of our genetic information—including predispositions to diseases,
ancestral and racial backgrounds, private medical information, familial
information, and information still to be deciphered—deserves more
protection than the pattern found at the tips of our fingers used only for
identification. Without further regulation and protection, Americans are
allowing collection of some of the most sensitive information that exists
about themselves, and all without a warrant. There is no comparable
sensitive information that is not thoroughly protected by regulation or wellestablished privacy interest.
3. Familial DNA
Familial searching generally refers to looking in a DNA database not
for the person who left the crime-scene sample, but rather for a relative of
that person.53 Understanding familial searches from a Fourth Amendment
perspective is difficult and has not been attempted by the Supreme Court.54
In King, the Court found that the acquisition of DNA constitutes a separate
Fourth Amendment event from the analysis of the DNA, and many have
speculated that the only manageable Fourth Amendment framework is to see
these two as distinct searches.55 Familial searches “fall between the cracks”
because “even if the searching violated a right, it is not clear it would be the
relative’s right (and not the original database lead’s).”56
A DNA sample “carries sensitive information about [an] individual—
and . . . about the close relatives of [an] individual.”57 In the context of
Fourth Amendment searches, “the convicted offender’s diminished privacy
51

King, 569 U.S. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Ram, supra note 28, at 881.
53
Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 291, 297 (2010).
54
Id. at 333.
55
Id. at 335; see also Ram, supra note 28, at 896.
56
Murphy, supra note 53, at 334–35.
57
David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial
Searching” 50 AM. L. REV. 109, 137 (2013).
52
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cannot in turn diminish the privacy of his or her relatives,” because “the
relative never ‘assumed a risk.’”58 This would be true whether the original
DNA came from an arrestee in CODIS or from a non-criminal database. In
both scenarios, the third party did not volunteer their DNA, and had no say
in their family member’s involuntary (or voluntary for genetic databases)
exposure of shared genetic data.
Recent cases have brought this issue to the forefront of the genetic
privacy debate. In April of 2010, investigators in California used familial
searching to uncover a potential match in search of the “Grim Sleeper.”59
Using the information from the search—that came from the killer’s
convicted son—the police conducted a sting operation, and collected a
discarded piece of pizza from the suspect’s trash, which was tested and found
to match the DNA found at the crime scenes.60 The suspect was subsequently
arrested.61 Those who oppose familial searches of CODIS argue that it serves
as a form of racial profiling because a higher population of inmates are
minorities, and this gives the authorities an ability to filter by race and
disproportionally toward minorities.62 Jeffery Rosen, a law Professor at
George Washington University, has stated that “the technique is not
inherently good or evil,” but rather that it has to do with “what crimes it is
used for, who’s in the database, how the database is regulated and what is
done with the samples.”63
Recently, the Golden State Killer was found in California using DNA
technology and non-governmental DNA databases.64 When the police found
no matches in CODIS, they uploaded the DNA to a public DNA database
website called GEDMatch.65 Although GEDMatch discloses that profiles
could be used to investigate violent crimes, many customers of genealogy
companies did not realize they would be signing up to help criminal
investigations.66 The disclosures led to “49 genetic identifications” and the

58

Murphy, supra note 53, at 336.
Murphy, supra note 53, at 294.
60
Murphy, supra note 53, at 294.
61
Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Grim Sleeper’ Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES
(July 8, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/us/09sleeper.html.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killergenealogy.html.
65
Id.
66
Heather Murphy, Sooner or Later Your Cousin’s DNA Is Going to Solve a Murder,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/golden-state-killerdna.html.
59
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reopening of a number of cold cases.67 An additional 300 cases are in the
process of being reopened: old murders, serial sexual assaults, and
unidentified bodies, according to estimates by various genealogists and
investigators.68 Some believe that the same regulations imposed by states on
CODIS should also be placed on family genealogy sites.69 As this method is
being used more and more, Americans are finding out that they have little to
no recourse to protect their genetic data.70 “In the hands of an advanced
genealogical sleuth, often all that’s needed to identify someone from a drop
of saliva, blood, or semen are the DNA profiles of two third cousins.”71 This
novel method of investigation requires analysis under the lens of the thirdparty doctrine of Miller, the DNA privacy interests in King, and a legal
framework for familial searching in crime solving.
Genetic information is a powerful tool. Like any powerful tool, it can
be used to make the world safer, or it can be used oppressively. In China,
the government is using genetic information to track, oppress, detain, and
control the minority population of Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic
group.72 Chinese Officials are saying that a comprehensive DNA database
could be used to chase down any Uighurs who resist conforming to the
Chinese campaign of “re-education” meant to make Uighurs more
subservient to the Communist Party.73 Dr. Kidd, a Yale Professor and a
major figure in the American genetics field, said he had been “unaware of
how his material and know-how were being used,” and the scientific
community is reeling from China’s use of DNA databases.74
Imagine a world where the police or other government enforcement
authority has the ability to find out private personal information about you
by finding pieces of hair you shed, or by finding your saliva on a water bottle
you discarded. Imagine a world where private genetic information about
your predisposition to diseases or your ancestral history can be traced back
to you, simply by a family member’s decision to submit their own genetic
information—even from a relative as distant as a third cousin. Police are not
supposed to be interested in the personal information—such as health
information or ancestry—within our DNA, and rather should only use it for
67

Id.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. (A third cousin is someone who shares a set of your sixteen great-great-great
grandparents, which might consist of over 800 people).
72
Sui-Lee Wee, China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American
Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/chinaxinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html.
73
Id.
74
Id.
68
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purposes of identifying individuals.75 And while the police are only allowed
to use this information for a limited purpose, genetic information is still
extremely sensitive and completely immutable, and for that reason police
should secure a warrant prior to obtaining and/or analyzing DNA. As some
of the examples above demonstrate, the use of genetic information is
evolving alongside our understanding of it. More safeguards are required to
maintain the balance of power between the people’s privacy interests and the
government’s interests in public safety. While the power of genetic
information may be used for good, it can also be applied for nefarious
purposes.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BREACHING GENETIC PRIVACY
A. Why Protect Genetic Information?
Upon first glance, some might ask why people should even be
concerned with the advancement of genetic technology and instead focus
solely on its beneficial effect on crime solving. As Justice Scalia points out
in his dissent in King, when America was still in its infancy, the British
would use “general warrants,” which were not grounded upon a sworn oath
of a specific infraction, and therefore were not limited in scope and
application.76 The Virginia Constitution first addressed general warrants as
“grievous and oppressive,” and “the Maryland Declaration of Rights
similarly provided that general warrants were ‘illegal.’”77 Worries about the
uses of oppressive police powers lead to “Madison’s draft of what became
the Fourth Amendment.”78 While courts have found that there is a “closely
guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless [sic]
searches,” these searches were never meant to serve “the normal need for
law enforcement.”79 Justice Scalia also made clear that “the legitimacy of
the Court’s method and the correctness of its outcome hinge entirely on the
truth of a single proposition: that the primary purpose of these DNA searches
is something other than simply discovering evidence of criminal
wrongdoing.”80
The Court in King attempted to maneuver around this requirement,
finding that the buccal swab and DNA acquisition was for “identification”
purposes, but “that seems . . . quite wrong—unless what one means by
75

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013)
King, 569 U.S. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77
Id. at 466–67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 467 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); King, 569 U.S. at 46768 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80
King, 569 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76
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‘identifying’ someone is ‘searching for evidence that he has committed
crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.’”81 Of course, if identifying
someone means finding out what unsolved crimes he has committed, then
“identification is indistinguishable from the ordinary law-enforcement aims
that have never been thought to justify a suspicionless [sic] search.”82
Significantly, “King was not identified by his association with the [DNA]
sample; rather, the sample was identified by its association with King,”
undermining the majority’s “identification” theory.83 In Justice Scalia’s
words, “it is safe to say that if the Court’s identification theory is not wrong,
there is no such thing as error.”84
To further bolster its identification argument, the Court in King
compares DNA to taking a person’s photograph or fingerprints.85 The Court,
however, has never held that a person has an expectation of privacy in a
photograph, nor that taking fingerprints is a Fourth Amendment search.86
Unlike DNA, which is used solely to solve crimes, fingerprints are actually
taken to identify arrestees and fingerprints do not contain the same level of
information as DNA.87 “Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it
occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than
the protection of our people from suspicionless [sic] law-enforcement
searches.”88 Justice Scalia closed his dissent by rejecting the idea that “the
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager
to open their mouths for royal inspection.”89
If we determine that our current understanding of genetic information
is inadequate, how might we reframe the way the law protects our genetic
information, or how might we promulgate regulations on the government’s
access, storage, and use of our personal genetic information?
B. “Ownership” of DNA
One possible solution to the issue of shared genetic information is to
treat shared DNA as protected by a theory similar to tenancy by the entirety.90
In her article “DNA by the Entirety,” Professor Ram explains two examples
81

Id. at 469–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83
Id. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84
Id. at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 459.
86
King, 569 U.S. at 476–77 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 458 (“fingerprinting
did not violate the Fourth Amendment precisely because it fit within the accepted means of
processing an arrestee into custody.”).
87
Id. at 478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 481 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 482 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90
Ram, supra note 52, at 877.
82
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of familial DNA threatening privacy interests.91 First, a member of the Lacks
family died from cervical cancer and had their cells used for research
resulting in the publication of that individual’s genome.92 Second, a man
suspected of a crime was found by his relation to a family member who had
also been arrested, and his DNA was “abandoned” and subsequently
collected, resulting in a positive match and an arrest.93 The three prominent
areas affected by familial privacy interests in genetic data are forensic
familial identification, genetic research, and personal genetic testing.94 If
identifiable genetic information is worthy of protection, “then legal
institutions must take its inherently shared nature seriously.”95
Because of the shared nature of DNA, an “individual’s authority to
control their ‘own’ identifiable genetic information may be affected by how
the government, research entities, or genetic testing firms make use of
genetic information drawn from close genetic relatives.”96 Unlike your
social security number, credit card information, or bank account number,
“the genetic information an individual inherits from her parents is the genetic
information she will always have.”97 Given the immutable nature of genetic
information, once it is exposed without your consent, “nothing can be done
to sever your connections to that information,” and both the individual and
their family would have suffered invasions to their genetic privacy.98 In the
terms of a tenancy by the entirety, “the shared nature of identifiable genetic
information is not subject to severance,” and therefore deserving of higher
scrutiny.99
Furthermore, genetic information is shared non-volitionally.100 This is
especially relevant in the context of “voluntarily shared” information.
“Notions of abandonment, which play a key role in both research and
forensic uses of genetic information . . . turn on some notion of volition—
the ‘knowing exposure’ of material or information to the public.”101
Some have postulated that “property offers a more advantageous lens
for addressing shared interests in identifiable genetic information.”102
Through tenancy by the entirety, the law chooses to perceive two people as
91
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one person at law, so that neither person owns any individual interest in an
estate, rather it belongs to the couple.103 “Genetic information among closely
related individuals also exhibits a unity of identity, . . . a biological one.”104
Certain policy measures already acknowledge the shared nature of genetic
privacy. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) extends
medical privacy protection to “genetic information,” and defines an
individual’s genetic data to include information about “the genetic tests of
family members of such individual.”105 Some solutions, like one practiced
in Iceland, include requiring the informed consent of family members before
shared genetic information is exposed.106
As applied, this property theory of DNA would consider the State’s use
of DNA in familial searching an encumbrance, and tenancy by the entirety
forbids encumbrance of shared property without the consent of the other
partner.107 The encumbrance would spread to any individual whose genetic
information is exploited by the government’s use.108 As far as “forfeiture”
of the property is concerned, the shared property is generally still protected,
as it is owned by the other spouse.109 In other words, “courts should constrain
the government to using genetic information it has lawfully obtained to
search for matches implicating the match offender—but not to search for
matches implicating the matching offender’s close genetic relatives.”110
Looking for an exact match only implicates the suspected offender’s genetic
privacy, and therefore does not breach the privacy of the suspect’s close
family members.111
C. Privacy as the Main Concern
Forensic analysis of DNA currently examines “variations in the lengths
of . . . short tandem repeats (STRs) to construct DNA profiles.”112 STRs
have medical implications, and can be used to identify inherited degenerative
neurological disorders that could lead to diseases like dementia.113 These
forms of genetic variations appear in both coding and non-coding regions of
103
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the genome, but the STRs that American forensic labs typically examine are
those located in non-coding portions of the genome.114 Significantly, new
research has cast doubt on the notion that non-coding DNA is “junk,” and
researchers have linked genetic disorders to STRs in non-coding regions of
genes, suggesting the distinction between coding and non-coding regions are
less rigid than previously thought.115
Direct-to-consumer companies like 23andMe distinguish the
“individual level information” that they supply to customers from the
“anonymized and aggregated information” that they share or sell to third
parties.116 “Individual level information” is information about a single
individual’s genotypes, diseases or traits/characteristics, which they
“anonymize and aggregate” by stripping the genome of an individual’s name
and contact information before aggregating the information with others.117
But recent studies have demonstrated that “anonymization” may not be
possible.118 Anonymization may not be possible because an individual can
be uniquely identified with access to just seventy-five single-nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs), while genome-wide association studies routinely
use more than 100,000 SNPs to genotype individuals.119 Re-identification is
possible even from pooled or aggregated DNA data and often yields
information about both the specific individual from whom the genetic
material came, and her close genetic relatives.120
Congress has demonstrated an understanding of the importance of
genetic information through passage of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).121 GINA “aims to protect individuals from
discrimination on the basis of genetic information in the employment and
health insurance markets.”122 GINA “clarifies that ‘genetic information’ is
‘health information’ under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).”123 HIPAA emphasizes the need for
control “where ‘individually identifiable’ information is at issue.”124 The
HIPAA definition depends on the “identifiable” nature of the information,
114
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so companies anonymize genetic data to be excluded from the definition, but
as this paper has already established, anonymous data has been re-identified
and therefore cannot be excluded from the HIPAA definition.125
As stated earlier in Part II, in King, the Supreme Court recognized that
“the analysis of identifiable genetic information, and not only its collection,
calls for constitutional scrutiny—and thus that identifiable genetic
information is information in which individuals may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy.”126 While the Court concluded that neither collection
nor analysis is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment where an
individual has been validly arrested for a serious crime, it is significant “that
the Court considered the genetic analysis independently, as it implies that
genetic analysis itself implicates a privacy interest of constitutional
magnitude.”127 While the privacy interest in that information will not
necessarily stop the government from making use of that information
without authorization, the “existence of that interest demands more
searching scrutiny where unauthorized or compelled genetic analysis is at
issue.”128 The differentiating factor in the King decision was the Court’s
finding of a diminished expectation of privacy based on King’s status as an
arrestee.129 The Court in King was also under the impression that the
information it claimed to be using for identification purposes was “junk,”
while we now know that is not the case—making the comparison to
fingerprints or photographs inapposite.130 “In sum, policymakers, courts, and
ordinary citizens agree: enabling individuals to control dissemination of their
identifiable genetic information—whether in the language of privacy or
property—is worthy of pursuit.”131
IV. HOW CARPENTER MIGHT AFFECT THE USE AND COLLECTION OF
GENETIC INFORMATION
A. Carpenter and the Third-Party Doctrine
In Carpenter v. United States,132 the Supreme Court held that: (1) the
government acquiring an individual’s historical cell-site location
information (CSLI) from wireless carriers constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment, and that the search invaded an individual’s reasonable
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expectation of privacy in the whole of his movements, despite the fact that
the government obtained the information from a third party; and (2) a court
order obtained by the government under the Stored Communications Act
was not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical CSLI because it
fell short of probable cause—therefore requiring a warrant.133
Timothy Carpenter was picked up by police concerning a number of
robberies that had occurred in the Detroit area.134 The police applied for a
court order, based on information given by the suspect, to obtain cell phone
records from Carpenter’s wireless carriers under the Stored Communications
Act.135 The cell phone records provided the government with 12,898 location
points cataloguing Carpenter’s movements, averaging out at about 101 per
day.136 Carpenter challenged the evidence with a motion to suppress the
CSLI, which he argued was obtained without a warrant supported by
probable cause, but the district court denied the motion.137 “The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the location information . . . because he had shared
that information with his wireless carriers,” and therefore it was not entitled
to Fourth Amendment protection.138 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and overturned the Sixth Circuit’s decision.139
Chief Justice Roberts began his legal analysis, echoing Justice Scalia’s
dissent in King, by recalling the reason for adopting the Fourth Amendment:
colonial “general warrants” and “writs of assistance.”140 The Court
acknowledged that, “[f]or much of our history, Fourth Amendment search
doctrine was tied to common-law trespass and focused on whether the
Government obtains information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area,” however, a more recent precedent has
established that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations.”141 This is so because “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places,” and “when an individual seeks to preserve
something as private, and his expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable[,] . . . official intrusion into that private
sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by
probable cause.”142
133
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While the Court acknowledged that “no single rubric definitively
resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection,” the Fourth
Amendment analysis “is informed by historical understandings of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted.”143 Roberts then offered some basics guideposts to Fourth
Amendment law, such as the “privacies of life against arbitrary power,” and
he explained that “the central aim of the Framers was to place obstacles in
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”144
In accounting for how the Fourth Amendment could apply to advanced
technology, the Court explained that technology has enhanced the
government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from
inquisitive eyes.145 The Court explained its responsibility to “assure
preservation of [the] degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted,” but continue to adapt with technology
“[b]ecause any other conclusion would leave [people] at the mercy of
advancing technology.”146
The difficulty in Carpenter was classifying the privacy interest
maintained by the defendant, and making it fit with one line of cases defining
location tracking and another line of cases concerning information offered to
a third party.147 In the first line of cases, the Court found that a person has a
protectable privacy interest in the constant tracking of his location, because
it is qualitatively different and more personal than other types of
information.148 In the second line of cases, the Court has held that “a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties,” even if “the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used for a limited purpose.”149
The “third-party doctrine” traces its roots to Miller, mentioned earlier
regarding the government’s acquisition of defendant’s financial information
from the bank, and Smith, a case involving phone carriers divulging
individuals’ phone numbers to the government.150 In Carpenter, the Court
differentiated Miller and Smith, by acknowledging that “while the third-party
doctrine applies to telephone numbers and bank records, it is not clear
whether its logic extends to the qualitatively different category of cell-site
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records.”151 At the time of Smith, no one imagined a society where a phone
goes wherever its owner goes and conveys information not only regarding
who the owner speaks to, but also where the owner travels.152 The Court
refused to apply Smith and Miller to Carpenter because of the “unique nature
of cell phone location records,” and because a person “maintains a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured
through CLSI.”153 Therefore, the fact that the information is held by a third
party “does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment
protection;” and “the location information obtained from Carpenter’s
wireless carriers was the product of a search” and required a warrant.154
Furthermore, the Court explained that “[a] person does not surrender
all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere[,] . . .
what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”155 Society’s expectation is that the
government would not, and could not, monitor a person’s every movement;
allowing the government access to CLSI would contravene that
expectation.156 These location records “hold for many Americans the
privacies of life,” because a cell phone is “almost a feature of human
anatomy.”157 The retrospective quality of the data also gives police access
to a category of information otherwise unknowable.158 With access to CLSI
the government can “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts,
subject only to the retention policies of the wireless carriers,” and the police
“need not even need know in advance whether they want to follow a
particular individual or when.”159
On the third-party doctrine, the Court rejected the government’s
argument that the information was void of privacy interest solely because it
was a “business record” and was in the hands of a third party.160 There is a
world of difference between the steady location tracking of an individual and
his bank records or phone number.161 The Court held the “third-party
doctrine stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation
of privacy in information” shared with another, but “diminished privacy
interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture
151
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entirely.”162 Because the third-party doctrine cannot be mechanically
applied, the Court in Carpenter found there are no comparable limitations
(as in Miller and Smith) on the revealing nature of CLSI (hence a finding that
it is “qualitatively different”).163
The second issue with the government’s third-party doctrine argument
was “voluntary exposure.”164 The Court rejected this argument because
CLSI is not voluntarily “shared” as that term is understood in the third-party
doctrine context.165 Just by using a phone, “[i]n no meaningful sense does
the user voluntarily assume the risk of turning over a comprehensive dossier
of his physical movements.”166 With that, the Court distinguishes Carpenter
from Smith and Miller, and finds that the fact that the Government obtained
the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to
Fourth Amendment protection.167
To be clear, the Supreme Court clarified that “its decision . . . is a
narrow one,” and does not “express a view on matters not before [it].”168 It,
however, reaffirms the proposition that the ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental search is reasonableness, and warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable (with some exceptions).169 “This is
certainly not to say that all orders compelling the production of documents
will require a showing of probable cause[,] . . . only that a warrant is required
in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records
held by a third party.”170 Thus, due to the fact that “CLSI is an entirely
different species of business record” and since location information
maintains a privacy interest, the Court opined that “[b]efore compelling a
wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, the Government’s
obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”171
B. The Protection of Genetic Information
While Carpenter dealt with a different type of protectable private
information, its reasoning, result, and guidance can inform decisions on how
to better regulate the use of genetic data in crime-solving. The rationale used
to address many of the issues discussed in Carpenter is nearly identical to
this comment’s proposed regulation of issues exposed by law enforcement
162
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acquiring individuals’ genetic information. These two issues are: (1)
whether genetic information taken from arrestees for “identification” is still
valid after debunking the innocence of “junk” DNA (therefore defining it as
qualitatively different or exceptional); and (2) whether the warrantless
collection of DNA is reasonable where it is involuntarily abandoned,
voluntarily exposed, or discovered through family ties. This issue deserves
more scrutiny after Carpenter decided that certain information deserves a
level of exceptionalism due to its degree of sensitivity.172
The Court in King considered the buccal swab of an arrestee a separate
search from the analysis of that swab, meaning both must be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.173 Originally, the Court believed that only
“junk DNA” was being used and that it was only used to identify the arrestee
as the subject of the crime.174 However, as the Court pointed out in
Carpenter, and Justice Scalia identified in his dissent in King, certain
evidence is qualitatively different. Just as Carpenter held that CSLI is
qualitatively different than simply following someone around because
tracking someone at every moment might reveal private information,
collecting and then analyzing DNA from arrestees is qualitatively different
than fingerprinting or photographing them because of the potential of
revealing deeply personal information.
Furthermore, the Court in King conducted a balancing test between the
interests of law enforcement officials and the interests of arrestees, and found
that the physical intrusion of the arrestees was minimal, and the use of DNA
was said to be harmless because it allegedly did not reveal genetic
information.175 Even though the physical buccal swab is a minimal intrusion,
if the non-coding regions of DNA do expose personal genetic information,
then the Court might need to revisit its balancing test with that in mind. The
fact that experts have found personal genetic information in non-coding
regions means that those areas of DNA need protection too, and as stated
earlier in this comment, anonymization and aggregation of data is also not a
guarantee against re-identification of a person with the data.
Where law enforcement officials collect genetic information from
individuals who are not arrestees, but instead only suspects, police may
acquire genetic information that is voluntarily exposed, involuntarily
abandoned, or shared by family members. Each method presents problems
of its own. First, genetic information that is voluntarily exposed is quite
similar to that of an individual who voluntarily shares her location with a
cell-service provider. Similar to individuals having their location tracked by
172
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consequence of using a phone, individuals who seek to benefit from
genealogy websites’ services—whether related to discovering private health
information or information about one’s ancestry—share the information
within their DNA with these companies and allow those companies to retain
that information as a consequence of the service they provide. Genetic
information would also deserve protection under Katz, because people
generally have a subjective expectation of privacy in their genetic material,
and that expectation is one that society is willing to recognize since both
HIPAA and GINA identify and protect such information.176 Unlike Miller,
where financial information was voluntarily shared with a bank, genetic
information has more serious implications because of the sensitivity of the
information, the information’s more covert but revealing nature, and the fact
that the information is more analogous to the Court’s reasoning in
Carpenter—that some types of information deserve a higher standard of
protection.
Second, while law enforcement officials often treat DNA naturally left
behind by suspects as “discarded,” this is an inappropriate means of
describing DNA. The Court in King defined the physical intrusion of
retrieving DNA from arrestees as a separate search from the DNA analysis,
so under this proposed framework even DNA that is involuntarily
“abandoned” should require a second independent search warrant before it
can be analyzed.177 Where DNA is voluntarily shared with a third party, a
court would look to the Miller Third-Party Doctrine, Katz’s expectation of
privacy, and Carpenter; but where genetic information is involuntarily shed
from the body, a court must consider whether or not it is fair to identify that
information as “abandoned.” In Carpenter, the Court pointed out that the
cell-phone’s connection to a cell tower created the location information
rather than the phone actively and purposely sharing its location with the
carrier.178 In other words, the location tracking was only a product of cell
usage and so it was not clear that it was voluntarily shared, but rather
compulsory. DNA is also compulsorily shared and dropped in the process
of everyday life, and unlike with cellphones, we cannot account for such
involuntary sharing of our information. People do not expect strangers to
collect and analyze their DNA as they might with discarded “trash,” and so
genetic information is qualitatively different than other types of expectations
of privacy, and the analogy of “abandoned” DNA to trash is inappropriate.
Third, the shared aspect of DNA further complicates the analysis,
because the acquisition of one individual’s DNA implicates others’ privacy
interests, and the law should account for DNA’s inherently shared nature. In
176
177
178

Ram, supra note 28, at 895.
Murphy, supra note 53, at 297.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.

SOBH(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

6/3/2020 3:55 PM

THE INTIMATE NATURE OF DNA IN CRIME-SOLVING 651

Carpenter, the Court was uneasy about the idea that the government could
acquire a detailed dossier of one’s every move for months, and called this
information “of a unique nature” requiring a warrant.179 Imagine if the police
had access to not only the suspect’s private location information, but also all
of their close relatives. Surely this would have called for further protection,
but the nature of technology allows for phones to be tracked individually and
one phone does not necessarily implicate another. This is not the case with
DNA, where one person’s genetic code is shared—to varying degrees—with
many people. The exposure of one person’s DNA is not only private to the
person who it came from, but also to family members. The inherently shared
nature of DNA is extremely valuable to law enforcement because in some
scenarios it may help solve an otherwise unsolvable cold case. Like the
Golden State Killer, other criminals might be subsequently caught or
captured using this technology, and this technology’s usefulness should not
be downplayed. Instead, if familial searching is something society deems
appropriate, the State and Federal legislatures should draft legislation and
dedicate the means to ensure it is done in accordance with the Fourth
Amendment. China has revealed to the world what it looks like for a
powerful police state to abuse genetic technology in order to oppress a
minority, and while the Constitution protects against many misuses of
government power, it is the Legislature’s responsibility to regulate the
Executives enforcement and investigative powers. While familial searching
has its utility, genetic information is exceptionally private, immutable, and
pervasive, and it must be protected as such.
V. CONCLUSION
DNA is unlike any other kind of personal information. Never before
has one piece of information had the capability to reveal such detailed
information about a person. From private health information, to genetic trait
propensities, to relatives and ancestry, it would be irrational to give less
protection to all the information within our genes than we do to all the
information within our cell phones. In an age where police can acquire DNA
consensually, covertly, or through familial ties, it is imperative that Fourth
Amendment law, as well as State and Federal regulations, adapt to advancing
technology, and act to protect Americans’ privacy interests in genetic
information.
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